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Abstract 
 
Background 
The United States health care system faces two fundamental challenges: a high growth 
rate of health care spending and deficiencies in quality of care. The growth rate of health care 
spending ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠdominant ﾠdriver ﾠof ﾠour ﾠnation’s ﾠlong-term federal debt, while the inconsistent 
quality of care hinders the ability of the health care system to maximize value for patients. To 
address both of these challenges, public and private payers are increasingly changing the way 
they pay providers—moving away from fee-for-service towards global payment contracts for 
groups of providers coming together as accountable care organizations. This thesis evaluates the 
change in health care spending and in quality of care associated with moving to global payment 
for accountable care organizations in Massachusetts in the first 4 years. 
This thesis studies the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality 
Contract (AQC), a global payment contract that provider organizations in Massachusetts began 
to enter in 2009. The AQC pays provider organizations a risk-adjusted global budget for the 
entire continuum of care for a defined population of enrollees insured by Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Massachusetts. It also awards substantial pay-for-performance incentives for organizations 
meeting performance thresholds on quality measures. This work assesses its effect on spending 
and quality through the first 4 years of the contract. 
 
Methods 
Enrollee-level claims data from 2006-2012 were used with a difference-in-differences 
design to evaluate the changes in spending and quality associated with the Alternative Quality 
Contract over the first 4 years. The study population consisted of enrollees in Blue Cross Blue 3 
 
Shield of Massachusetts plans (intervention group) and enrollees in commercial employer-
sponsored plans across 5 comparison states (control group).  
Unadjusted and adjusted results are reported for each comparison between intervention 
and control. Changes in spending for all 4 AQC cohorts relative to control were evaluated. In 
adjusted analyses of spending, I used a multivariate linear model at the enrollee-quarter level, 
controlling for age, sex, risk score, indicators for intervention, quarters of the study period, the 
post-intervention period, and the appropriate interactions. For analyses of quality, an analogous 
model at the enrollee-year level was used. Process and outcome quality were evaluated. 
 
Results 
Seven provider organizations joined the AQC in 2009, with a total of 490,167 individuals 
who were enrolled for at least 1 calendar year in the study period. The control group had 966,813 
unique individuals enrolled for at least 1 year during the study period. Average age, sex, and risk 
scores before and after the AQC were similar between the two groups. 
In the 2009 cohort, claims spending grew on average $62.21 per enrollee per quarter less 
than control over 4 years (p<0.001), a 6.8% savings. Analogously, the 2010, 2011, and 2012 
cohorts had average savings of 8.8% (p<0.001), 9.1% (p<0.001), and 5.8% (p=0.04), 
respectively, by the end of 2012. Savings on claims were concentrated in the outpatient facility 
setting, specifically procedures, imaging, and tests (8.7%, 10.9%, and 9.7%, respectively, 
p<0.001). Organizations with and without risk-contracting experience saw similar average 
savings of 6.3% and 7.7%, respectively, over 4 years (p<0.001). About 40% of savings were 
explained by lower volume. Pre-intervention trends were not statistically different between 
intervention and control (-$4.57, p=0.86), suggesting savings were not driven by inherently 
different trajectories of spending. No differences in coding intensity were found. In sensitivity 4 
 
analyses, estimates were robust to alterations in the model, variables, and sample. Notably, 
claims savings were exceeded by incentive payments to providers (shared savings and quality 
bonuses) in 2009-2011, but exceeded incentives payments in 2012, generating net savings.  
Improvements in quality among intervention cohorts generally exceeded New England 
and national comparisons. Quality performance on chronic care measures increased from 79.6% 
pre-intervention to 84.5% post-intervention in the 2009 cohort, compared to 79.8% to 80.8% for 
the HEDIS national average, a 3.9 percentage-point relative increase over the 4 years. 
Analogously, preventive care and pediatric care measures increased 2.7 and 2.4 percentage 
points relative to control, respectively. On outcome measures, achievement of hemoglobin A1c, 
LDL cholesterol, and blood pressure control grew by 2.1 percentage points per year in the 2009 
cohort after the AQC, while HEDIS averages remained largely unchanged (Figure). 
 
Conclusion 
After 4 years, physician organizations in the AQC had lower spending growth relative to 
control and generally outperformed national averages on quality measures. Shared savings 
coupled with quality bonuses can exceed savings on claims in initial years, but over time, 
savings on claims may outgrow incentive payments. Incentive payments themselves may serve 
meaningful purposes, as quality measures may protect against stinting and shared savings may 
help ease providers into risk contracts. Changes in utilization suggest that this payment model 
can help modify underlying care patterns, a likely prerequisite for sustainable reform. The AQC 
experience may be useful to policymakers, insurers, and providers embarking on payment 
reform. Combining global budgets with pay-for- performance may encourage organizations to 
embark on the delivery system reforms necessary to slow spending and improve quality. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
ACA – Affordable Care Act 
ACO – Accountable care organization 
AQC – Alternative Quality Contract (by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts) 
BCBSMA – Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
CMMI – Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
CMS – Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DxCG – Diagnostic Cost Groups (trademark software of Verisk Health) 
HbA1c – Hemoglobin A1c 
HMO – Health maintenance organization (a type of insurance plan) 
HEDIS – Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set 
LDL – Low density lipoprotein cholesterol 
P4P – Pay-for-performance 
PCP – Primary care physician 
PCMH – Patient-centered medical home 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States health care system faces two significant challenges: an unsustainable 
growth rate of health care spending and deficiencies in quality of care. The growth rate of health 
care spending is the dominant driver of our nation’s ﾠlong-term federal debt.
1,2,3,4 Meanwhile, the 
poor quality of care in certain parts of the health care system continues to put patients at risk.  
To address both of these challenges, public and private payers are changing the way that 
physicians and hospitals are paid. Increasingly, payers are moving away from fee-for-service and 
adopting global payment contracts for groups of providers working together as accountable care 
organizations (ACOs).
5 The ACO concept has garnered policy interest in recent years.
6
,
7 ACOs 
are discussed as a payment and delivery model with the potential to slow spending and improve 
quality by giving providers incentives—such as through a global payment—to reduce wasteful 
utilization, improve care coordination, and manage population health.
8,9 However, despite the 
optimism generated by ACOs, evidence of its effectiveness in lowering spending and improving 
quality remain limited to date.  
This thesis evaluates the changes in health care spending and quality of care associated 
with moving to global payment for accountable care organizations in Massachusetts. It studies 
the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract and reports the results 
on spending and quality in the first 4 years of the contract. 
 
1.1.  Accountable Care Organizations 
 
An ACO is a group of providers that accepts joint accountability for health care spending 
and quality for a defined population of patients.
10 Three parts of this definition deserve particular 8 
 
emphasis. First, the ACO is a group of providers, which often includes physicians, allied health 
professionals, hospitals, post-acute facilities, and other providers or facilities.  
Second, providers in the ACO have joint accountability for spending and quality. Joint 
accountability for spending is manifested through a spending target for the entire organization 
for a year, whereby the ACO shares savings with the payer if spending falls below the target and 
may share financial risk with the payer of spending exceeding the target. Joint accountability for 
quality is implemented via a set of quality measures, which can include process measures (such 
as annual eye exams for patients with diabetes), outcome measures (hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) in 
patients with diabetes), patient experience measures, and others. ACOs are rewarded for their 
performance on quality measures, usually measured at the end of a year. These accountabilities 
for spending and quality can be further tied together; for example, an ACO might only receive 
quality measures if a minimum savings is achieved.  
Third, an ACO is responsible for the spending and quality of a defined population. The 
population may be defined prospectively, meaning that going into a year, the ACO is assigned a 
pre-defined population of patients in a geographic area. This enables the ACO to know exactly 
which patients it is responsible for during the year. Alternatively, the population may be defined 
retrospectively, whereby at the end of a year, the ACO assumes responsibility for spending and 
quality for any patients who received the plurality of their care through the ACO. Retrospective 
assignment does not allow an ACO to know exactly who it is responsible at the beginning of the 
year, although the organization may have a stable patient population through a given payer. 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 included provisions for the creation of ACOs in 
the Medicare program, which began in 2012.
11 Through the Medicare Shared Savings program, 
provider ﾠgroups ﾠcan ﾠbecome ﾠACOs ﾠby ﾠchoosing ﾠa ﾠ“one-sided” ﾠmodel ﾠin which they share savings 
with ﾠMedicare ﾠor ﾠa ﾠ“two-sided” ﾠmodel ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠthey ﾠshare ﾠsavings ﾠand ﾠrisk. ﾠBoth ﾠmodels ﾠalso ﾠ9 
 
reward quality via reporting and performance on a set of 33 quality measures. In January 2012, 
32 advanced organizations across the country ﾠbegan ﾠ“Pioneer” ﾠACO ﾠcontracts ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠ
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), part of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS). Compared to ACOs in the Shared Savings Program, the Pioneer ACOs took on 
greater risk and greater reward in a more robust two-sided model.  
Since then, 4 waves of Shared Savings ACOs have been rolled out by CMS (Figure 1). 
The first comprised of 27 ACOs serving about 375,000 Medicare beneficiaries starting their 
contracts in April, 2012; the second 89 ACOs serving 1.2 million beneficiaries starting in July, 
2012; the third 106 ACOs serving 1.6 million beneficiaries starting in January, 2013; the fourth 
123 ACOs serving 1.5 million beneficiaries announced most recently in December, 2013. The 
Shared Savings ACOs are primarily in a one-sided contract, although there are several ACOs in 
the Shared Savings program that are in two-sided contracts. 
Outside of Medicare, provider organizations are increasing entering ACO contracts with 
private insurers. Early estimates in 2011 suggested that about 100 provider organizations across 
the country were working with private insurers to implement ACO-type contracts.
5 Most recent 
estimates suggest that number has increased, and that combined with public sector ACOs in the 
Medicare program, about 18 million covered lives in the U.S. are now under an ACO contract.
12  
 
1.1.  Payment reform in Massachusetts 
 
Massachusetts was an early adopter of global payment and ACOs in both the private and 
public sectors.
13 After expanding insurance coverage to the uninsured in 2006, Massachusetts set 
off to combat the unsustainable growth in health care spending.
14 A series of events provided an 
opportunity for stakeholders in the state to debate the merits and pitfalls of policies aimed at cost 10 
 
control (Figure 2). A special state commission in 2009 voted unanimously to transition the state 
away from fee-for-service to global payment with 5 years. The Office of the Attorney General 
published several widely-read reports concerning payment differences and market power across 
Massachusetts providers in the ensuing years. Governor Deval Patrick made cost control a core 
piece of his legislative agenda; meanwhile the state legislature also took up cost control in a few 
prominent proposals. This effort by state government, working in conjunction with stakeholders 
from across the state, eventually led to a health care cost containment bill (Chapter 224 of the 
Acts of 2012) that Governor Patrick signed into law in August 6, 2012. The bill stipulates that 
health ﾠcare ﾠspending ﾠcannot ﾠgrow ﾠfaster ﾠthan ﾠthe ﾠstate’s ﾠeconomy ﾠthrough ﾠ2017. ﾠ  
In the context of this broader state movement towards payment reform, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield ﾠof ﾠMassachusetts ﾠ(BCBSMA), ﾠthe ﾠstate’s ﾠlargest ﾠprivate ﾠinsurer, ﾠbegan ﾠa ﾠglobal ﾠpayment 
initiative in 2009 in the form of the Alternative Quality Contract. The contract, described below 
in more detail, is a two-sided ACO agreement that pays physician organizations a global budget 
to take care of the entire continuum of care for a population of enrollees. Seven Massachusetts 
physician organizations joined the contract in the first year. Since then, additional organizations 
have entered the contract, with 4 organizations joining in 2010, 1 in 2011, and 6 in 2012 (Figure 
2). By the end of 2012, approximately 85 percent of physicians in the BCBSMA network were in 
organizations that had joined the AQC.  
In recent years, other private insurers in Massachusetts have also moved away from fee-
for-service towards global payment contracts. For example, in 2011 Tufts Health Plan launched 
its Coordinated Care Model, which transitions physician organizations to risk-based global 
payment contracts with incentives for quality performance. By the end of 2012, Tufts Health 
Plan had approximately 90 percent of their Medicare Advantage health maintenance organization 
members in risk contracts and 72 percent of commercial enrollees in risk contracts.
15 Similar to 11 
 
the Alternative Quality Contract, Tufts Health Plan provides physician organizations frequent 
and customized data analysis on their utilization rates, referral patterns, and spending.  
When the Pioneer ACO program launched in January, 2012, 5 physician organizations in 
Massachusetts were part of the initial cohort of 32 ACOs. These organizations included Atrius 
Health, Beth Israel Deaconess Physician Organization, Mount Auburn Cambridge Independent 
Practice Association, Partners Healthcare, and Steward Health Care. Massachusetts has also seen 
a number of additional physician organizations join the Medicare Shared Savings Program in the 
subsequent years.  
 
1.2.  Alternative Quality Contract 
 
The Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) is a global payment contract that pays physician 
organizations a risk-adjusted budget to take care of defined population of enrollees. The contract 
has several unique features. First, it is a multi-year (most often 5-year) ACO contracting model 
in which the global payment covers the entire continuum of care, including inpatient, outpatient, 
and post-acute care for patients assigned to the physician organization. Notably, the organization 
is accountable for all medical spending incurred by enrollees in the contract. Care received in the 
ACO to which their primary care physicians belong and received elsewhere are similarly counted 
towards the home organization’s budget. The size of the budget and the growth rate of the budget 
are determined through negotiations between BCBSMA and the organization. In 2009, all ACOs 
initially entering the AQC received budgets exceeding their 2008 spending. Throughout the year, 
claims are added up on a fee-for-service basis using negotiated prices. 
Second, the AQC was initially launched within health maintenance organization (HMO) 
plans in the BCBSMA network. Enrollees in HMO plans are required to designate a primary care 12 
 
physician (PCP) at the beginning of each year. This allows for attribution of patients to an ACO 
through ﾠthe ﾠpatient’s ﾠPCP, ﾠwho ﾠeffectively ﾠmanages ﾠthe ﾠenrollee’s ﾠbudget ﾠon ﾠbehalf ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠPCP’s ﾠ
organization. This feature is similar to many patient-centered medical home (PCMH) models, in 
which each patient is linked to a PCP responsible ﾠfor ﾠcoordinating ﾠthe ﾠpatient’s ﾠcare.
16,17,18,19  
Third, ﾠthe ﾠAQC ﾠawards ﾠquality ﾠbonuses ﾠup ﾠto ﾠ10 ﾠpercent ﾠof ﾠan ﾠorganization’s ﾠglobal ﾠ
budget through performance on quality measures. The quality measures are shown in Appendix 
1. The AQC uses 64 measures, half of them focus on ambulatory quality and the other half on 
inpatient ﾠquality ﾠof ﾠcare. ﾠAt ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠeach ﾠyear, ﾠan ﾠorganization’s ﾠperformance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmeasures ﾠ
is summed ﾠto ﾠan ﾠaggregate, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠused ﾠto ﾠdetermine ﾠthe ﾠpercent ﾠof ﾠan ﾠorganization’s ﾠbudget ﾠit ﾠ
will receive as a bonus payment. BCBSMA defines 5 aggregate performance thresholds; the top 
threshold rewards organizations the full 10 percent bonus. Measures are weighted differently; for 
example, patient experience measures are triple-weighted relative to most measures (Appendix 
1). The size of the AQC quality bonus is larger than typical U.S. pay-for-performance contracts.  
Fourth, BCBSMA provides AQC organizations technical support to help them achieve 
their cost and quality goals. For example, organizations receive spending and quality reports on a 
regular basis, which allow them to compare performance relative to peer organizations in the 
state. Utilization rates compared to peer organizations for standardized patients are also reported 
to the AQC organizations in order to help them identify areas of potential overuse. 
 
1.3.  State of the Field 
 
In the first year, the AQC was associated with a 1.9 percent reduction in medical 
spending and modest quality improvements.
20 The initial savings were largely achieved through 
lower prices rather than reductions in the volume of services. This finding was consistent with 13 
 
AQC ﾠgroups’ ﾠinitial ﾠfocus ﾠof ﾠshifting ﾠreferrals to less expensive providers.
21 Moreover, the 
reduction in total medical spending associated with the AQC was likely smaller than the sum of 
shared savings, payments for quality bonuses, and payments for infrastructure support that 
BCBSMA provided to organizations. In the second year, the AQC was associated with a larger 
reduction in medical spending of 3.3 percent relative to control and continued improvements in 
quality of care.
22 In addition to achieving savings through referring patients to lower-priced 
providers, organizations in year 2 also lowered spending through decreases in utilization, as 
documented in this thesis. 
In the first 2 years, the AQC was also found to be associated with a decrease in spending 
for Medicare beneficiaries.
23 These savings were concentrated in similar services and settings as 
those for enrollees in the AQC, suggesting that the impact of one payment contract may lead to 
“spillover” ﾠeffects ﾠfor ﾠother ﾠpopulations ﾠnot ﾠcovered ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠcontract when organizations have a 
multi-payer patient mix. Further work on AQC effects for the pediatric population show that the 
contract did not meaningfully impact spending in the first two years but improved the quality of 
care for children, especially for children with special health care needs.
24  
Year-1 results for Medicare Pioneer ACOs were recently released by CMS on July 16, 
2013. Pioneer ACOs generated a gross savings of $87.6 million largely through reductions in 
admissions and readmissions, of which $33 million went to the Medicare Trust Fund.
25 These 
savings came from 13 of the 32 organizations, while 17 organizations did not spend significantly 
more or less than their spending targets and 2 organizations faced financial losses totaling about 
$4 million. All Pioneer ACOs were rewarded for reporting on quality measures, whose bonuses 
were not tied to actual performance on quality in the first year. Nevertheless, Pioneer ACOs did 
better on blood pressure and cholesterol control for beneficiaries with diabetes than did 
managed-care plans, and better on readmissions relative to the Medicare fee-for-service 14 
 
benchmark. After the first year, 9 Pioneer ACOs left the program while 23 remained, suggesting 
that while the year-1 results were encouraging, substantial challenges are faced by organizations 
transitioning into ACO contracts, especially two-sided contracts that include financial risk.
26  
Interim year-1 results for the Shares Savings program were released on January 30, 2014. 
According to CMS, 54 out of 114 Shared Savings ACOs that started in 2012 achieved spending 
lower than their expected levels.
27 Of these, 29 ACOs generated savings over $126 million, with 
a total net savings of $128 million to the Medicare Trust Fund. 
A more complete analysis of the characteristics of early ACOs in the Medicare program 
demonstrated that patients in ACOs tended to be older, have higher incomes, were less likely to 
be covered by Medicaid, and less likely to be African American or disabled compared to those in 
non-ACOs.
28 Cost of care was lower for patients in ACOs. Moreover, hospitals that were a part 
of ACOs were more likely to be large academic medical centers, and hospitals in ACOs did not 
have measurably higher performance on quality measures than non-ACO hospitals. Additional 
research on the link between organizational characteristics and spending demonstrated that large 
independent physician organizations with a strong primary care orientation tended to have lower 
spending and higher quality measures for Medicare beneficiaries.
29  
 
1.4.  Purpose of Inquiry 
 
To date, little evidence exists regarding the effect of global payment in ACOs on health 
care spending and quality beyond the first year or two. This thesis evaluates changes in spending 
and quality associated with the AQC in Massachusetts through the first 4 years of the contract. 
Understanding the potential implications of moving to global payment beyond the initial years 15 
 
may help inform physician organizations as they increasingly enter ACO contracts. Evidence on 
longer-term AQC effects may also inform policymakers and other states. 
In compliance with the Harvard Medical School thesis guidelines, year-1 results of the 
AQC are not discussed in this document because they were a part of my dissertation in the PhD 
Program in Health Policy. Year-2 results through the most recent year-4 results are included in 
this thesis for Harvard Medical School.  
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2.  METHODS 
 
2.1.  Population 
 
The study population consisted of enrollees in BCBSMA (intervention group) and 
commercial employer-sponsored plans in comparison states (control group) from January 2006 
through December 2012. All enrollees were under the age of 65 and continuously enrolled in a 
plan for at least one calendar year during the study period. The AQC was implemented in 
BCBSMA health maintenance organization (HMO) plans, in which enrollees are required to 
designate a PCP.  
The 2009 intervention cohort comprised BCBSMA enrollees whose PCPs were affiliated 
with an organization that entered the AQC in 2009. Within the 2009 cohort, 2 subgroups pre-
specified. ﾠThe ﾠ“prior-risk” ﾠsubgroup ﾠcomprised ﾠ4 ﾠorganizations ﾠthat ﾠhad ﾠprior ﾠexperience ﾠ
managing risk-based ﾠcontracts ﾠfrom ﾠBCBC, ﾠwhile ﾠthe ﾠ“no-prior-risk” ﾠsubgroup ﾠcomprised ﾠ3 ﾠ
organizations that entered the AQC without BCBS risk-contracting experience. Provider 
organizations in the prior-risk subgroup tended to be larger, more established delivery systems, 
while those in the no-prior-risk subgroup were smaller organizations, including physician groups 
that were newly formed prior to entering the AQC. 
The control group consisted of enrollees whose PCPs belonged to an organization that 
did not enter the AQC. For analyses of year-1 (2009) and year-2 (2010) AQC effects in the 2009 
cohort, ﾠcontrol ﾠsubjects ﾠwere ﾠBCBS ﾠenrollees ﾠwhose ﾠPCPs’ ﾠorganizations ﾠhad ﾠnot ﾠjoined ﾠthe ﾠ
AQC by the end of year 2 (2010). However, by year 4 (2012) about 85 percent of physicians in 
Massachusetts had joined the AQC, including the large majority of those serving as the control 
group in the year-1 and year-2 analyses. The remaining physicians not in the AQC by 2012 were 17 
 
not a representative sample; they were largely very small practices and were receiving different 
percent payment updates from BCBS as a result of not being in an incentive contract. Thus, the 
year-3 and year-4 analyses required a control group from outside of Massachusetts. The solution 
was to obtain a pooled cohort of similar enrollees from comparison states. 
The control group comprised commercially insured individuals in employer-sponsored 
plans across all 8 other Northeastern states (Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, New Hampshire, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont). All individuals were under age 65 and 
continuously enrolled in a health maintenance organization or point-of-service plan for at least 1 
year between 2006 and 2012. Importantly, these plan types have physician networks and require 
enrollees to designate a PCP, similar to the AQC. All belonged to employers that continuously 
reported claims for the 7 years in the study period. Compared to Massachusetts, these states have 
similar demographic profiles; they have both large academic health systems as well as smaller 
community providers; and they have competition among multiple commercial insurers. The main 
identification strategy comes from the fact that none of these control states had a broad-scale 
payment reform implemented by a large commercial insurer that moved provider organizations 
from fee-for-service to global payment in the study period. Some states, such as Rhode Island, 
began piloting patient-centered medical home models in the later years of our study period. Do 
date, these interventions have not been shown to significantly impact spending. 
While the 2009 AQC cohort comprised the main analyses of this work, the AQC 
continued to expand in subsequent years. Physician organizations that entered the AQC in 2010, 
2011, and 2012 separately comprised different intervention cohorts in each of those years. By the 
end of 2012, the year-1, year-2, and year-3 changes in spending and quality associated with the 
AQC could be calculated for the 2010 cohort. Analogously, the year-1 and year-2 changes could 
be calculated for the 2011 cohort, and the lone year-1 analysis could be carried out on the 2012 18 
 
cohort. I carried out these subsequent analyses for the AQC cohorts after 2009 and highlight the 
major findings here. However, this research focuses on the 2009 cohort, for which results up to 
year 4 are available.  
 
2.2.  Data 
 
For both intervention and control groups, I used de-identified enrollee-level claims and 
membership data from 2006-2012. Data for BCBSMA enrollees consisted of outpatient claims, 
inpatient claims, and prescription pharmaceutical claims, as well as enrollment data linked to 
provider information. Provider data was also de-identified, and included linkages to the provider 
organization in the BCBSMA network. Data for control subjects were drawn from the 2006-2012 
Truven (formerly Thomson Reuters MarketScan) Commercial Claims and Encounters database. 
This database is derived from a large convenience sample of commercially insured individuals in 
employer-sponsored plans offered by large firms throughout the United States. The data has been 
used extensively for research purposes.
30 The employers report all outpatient, inpatient, and 
prescription pharmaceutical claims, along with member enrollment and provider information, 
similar to the BCBSMA data. However, provider information does not contain linkages to any 
specific organizations. I also cannot identify specific insurers or link enrollees to insurers. 
I used the DxCG (Diagnostic Cost Groups) software by Verisk Health to generate risk 
scores for each enrollee in each year among both the intervention and control group. The DxCG 
software uses age, sex, enrollment, and diagnostic information in the form of International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes on the claims to generate an annual risk score at the 
enrollee level.
31 It is used by most private insurers in the U.S. as a risk-adjustment method and 
was based on foundational work using Medicare data.
32 Statistical models in the DxCG software 19 
 
are capable of generating concurrent and prospective risk scores. Consistent with prior work on 
the AQC, I generated a concurrent risk score, which correlates ﾠa ﾠgiven ﾠyear’s ﾠtotal ﾠmedical 
spending to the diagnoses and demographic information from the concurrent year. Higher risk 
scores represent higher expected spending on an annual basis. 
Data on quality included ambulatory process measures, separated into chronic care 
management measures, adult preventive measures, and pediatric measures. The process measures 
were available on an annual enrollee level in the BCBS data from 2007-2010. Therefore, for the 
2009 cohort, year-1 and year-2 changes in quality associated with the AQC could be analyzed 
using statistical models similar to analyses of spending, because the control group in the first 2 
years was BCBS enrollees whose PCPs belonged to organizations that did not enter the AQC. In 
the analysis beyond 2 years, however, the control group was the comparison states as described 
above, drawn from the Truven data, which does not include quality measures. Thus, comparison 
quality data for the further longitudinal analysis into years 3 and 4 were obtained from the 
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS). I used HEDIS national averages as 
the comparison for enrollees in the AQC. 
Quality data also included 5 outcome measures: hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) control for 
patients with diabetes (≤9 percent), low density liproprotein (LDL) cholesterol control for 
patients with diabetes (<100 mg/dL), and blood pressure control for patients with diabetics 
(<140/80 mmHg), as well as blood pressure control for patients with cardiovascular disease 
(<140/90 mmHg), and LDL control for patients with cardiovascular disease (<100 mg/dL). 
Enrollee-level tracking of outcome quality measures was not implemented prior to the AQC. 
Therefore, the analysis of outcome measures was done by calculating average performance in 
each year for the entire 2009 AQC cohort. I compared outcomes among AQC enrollees to the 
HEDIS national averages. 20 
 
 
2.3.  Study Design 
 
This analysis used a difference-in-difference approach to isolate the changes in health 
care spending and quality associated with the AQC intervention. The difference-in-differences 
approach is an economic method for program evaluation when data on treatment and control 
groups are available both before and after the intervention. It centers on calculating the change in 
the outcome from before to after the intervention in both the intervention and the control group. 
The change in the control group is then subtracted from the change in the intervention group to 
remove the effect of unobserved variables influencing both groups and to isolate the treatment 
effect associated with the intervention.
33 
The primary analysis consists of the 2009 AQC cohort and control. The pre-intervention 
period was 2006-2008 and the post-intervention period was 2009-2012. In the spending analysis, 
the dependent variable was the sum of inpatient and outpatient medical spending (including 
patient cost sharing). Spending was calculated from claims payments made by the insurer to 
providers, which reflects negotiated fee-for-service prices. Pharmaceutical claims were added to 
spending in the sensitivity analyses; they were excluded from the main model because not all 
enrollees had pharmaceutical benefits administered by their primary insurer. Pharmaceutical 
benefits may be carved out, in which case I did not observe drug claims or incentives associated 
with drug formularies or implemented by drug benefit managers. All spending was adjusted to 
2012 U.S. dollars.  
To analyze changes in spending by type of care (facility versus professional) and site of 
care (inpatient versus outpatient), I decomposed spending along these two dimensions. To also 
analyze results by categories of medical services, I assigned spending according to categories of 21 
 
care using the Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) classification system from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
34 Finally, utilization of services was computed by counting 
actual numbers of services delivered to patients in the claims. For ease of interpretation, I scaled 
utilization data to volume per thousand enrollees.  
 
2.4.  Statistical Analysis   
 
An enrollee-level linear model was used, controlling for age, sex, risk score, indicator for 
AQC, year indicators, and interactions between AQC and year. These interactions estimated 
changes attributable to the AQC, but should be interpreted while recognizing other factors in 
Massachusetts may have influenced spending or quality. Dollar results for each year were scaled 
into percentages by dividing by the current year claims costs. State and plan fixed effects were 
also included to account for such time-invariant characteristics between individuals. Consistent 
with prior work on the AQC, this model was not logarithmically transformed because the DxCG 
risk score is designed to predict dollar spending and linear models have been shown to better 
predict health spending than more complex functional forms. Especially with large sample sizes, 
linear models generally outperform other statistical models at estimating population averages, 
even though they can be less precise at estimating the tails of a spending distribution.
35 
36 
37 
38 
Results are reported with 2-tailed P values. 
 
2.4.1.  Model for Spending 
 
The reduced-form model is shown below in equation (1). In this model, Xit includes a 
vector of enrollee characteristics, including age categories, age-sex interactions, and the DxCG 22 
 
risk score. The indicator variable aqci denotes assignment of each individual i to the treatment or 
control group. The vector of year indicators is represented by yt, and the AQC-year interactions 
are represented by yt*aqc, which produce the coefficients of interest. To account for multiple 
observations within individuals, Huber-White corrections were used to adjust standard errors 
clustered at the plan level.
39,40  
 
  Spendingit = ﾠαit + Xitδ + ﾠβ1yt + ﾠβ2aqci + (yt*aqci)γ ﾠ+ ﾠεit  (1) 
 
In difference-in-differences models, identification of the policy effect on the outcome of 
interest relies on similar pre-intervention trends. For each AQC cohort, I tested for differences in 
pre-intervention trends in spending between the intervention and control groups.  
Given that spending is the product of price and quantity, any policy intervention that is 
associated with a change in spending must be associated with a change in prices or a change in 
quantities. I assessed the relative contributions of price and quantity to the spending results by 
standardizing the prices for each service to its median price across all providers in 2006-2012. 
Reanalyzing the model with the standardized prices, differences in spending associated with the 
AQC reflect differences in utilization. Furthermore, I assessed whether the price effect was due 
to differential changes in negotiated fees or differential changes in referral patterns (referring 
patients to less expensive physicians or hospitals). I used models of utilization to directly analyze 
the relationship between the AQC and quantity of specific services. 
 
2.4.2.  Model for Quality 
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The association between the AQC and changes in quality measures in the first 2 years 
was studied using an analogous difference-in-difference model. I pooled BCBSMA process 
measures into their categories for aggregate analysis: chronic care management, adult preventive 
care, and pediatric care. I also analyzed separate models for each individual measure. Quality 
measures are calculated on an annual basis for each enrollee. Therefore, each observation in this 
model is at the enrollee-year level. 
In the analysis of aggregate measures, I included measure-level fixed effects. Therefore, 
the results are interpreted as average changes within measures associated with the AQC. This is 
included because different measures have different baseline levels of achievement. In sensitivity 
analyses, models without measure-level fixed effects were analyzed. Process quality measures 
were available at the enrollee level from 2007 to 2012. Thus, this statistical model was used to 
analyze the year-1 and year-2 quality results for the 2009 AQC cohort. As mentioned above, the 
year-3 and year-4 quality analyses were done descriptively, by comparing the 2009 AQC cohort 
averages to the HEDIS national averages.  
All analyses of outcome quality measures were conducted descriptively. The unadjusted 
percentage of the 2009 AQC cohort achieving quality performance on the 5 measures related to 
blood pressure, LDL control, and HbA1c were calculated by year. This was compared to HEDIS 
national averages, consistent with process quality analyses after the first 2 years. 
 
2.4.3.  Sensitivity Analyses 
 
To test the robustness of the statistical model, I conducted a series of sensitivity analyses. 
These included alterations to the statistical model as well as to variables and sample. Alterations 
in the statistical model included omitting state or plan fixed effects, covariates, risk score, and 24 
 
substituting percent cost-sharing in place of plan fixed effects. Alterations to variables or sample 
included analyzing only enrollees who were continuously enrolled in the study period, defining 
the risk score as a categorical variable using deciles, omitting cost-sharing from spending, adding 
pharmaceutical claims to spending, lagging the prospective risk score, using HMO controls only, 
and using both within-Massachusetts and national controls. For the analysis of quality, I used a 
logit model in sensitivity analyses in place of the linear probability model.  
In a global budget payment system, another concern is the possibility of coding behavior 
changes that may lead to differences in spending adjusted for risk. For example, if organizations 
code at a higher intensity in a given year, this may garner a larger global payment in the future if 
spending in the given year is used to calculate future spending targets. An increase in the coding 
of AQC patients would make them appear sicker and make spending adjusted for risk score seem 
lower. Prior work showed that any risk score changes associated with the AQC explained only a 
small portion of spending differences. I repeated this analysis through the first 4 years by putting 
the risk score as the dependent variable in the model. This issue has been previously discussed in 
the evaluation of the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration.
41 
All analyses were carried out using STATA software, version 13. The Harvard Medical 
School Office for Research Subject Protection approved this study protocol. 
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3.  RESULTS  
 
3.1.  Population 
 
Characteristics of the 4 AQC cohorts and control group are shown in Table 1. Enrollees 
in the AQC had an average age of approximately 35 years, and the population was about 51 
percent female. Average DxCG risk scores for the cohorts ranged from 1.03 to 1.05 with similar 
distributions. Enrollee cost sharing average between 11 and 14 percent across cohorts, also with 
similar distributions. Across the study period, the 2009 AQC cohort comprised 490,167 unique 
enrollees who were enrolled for at least 1 calendar year. These enrollees designated one of about 
1,100 PCPs practicing across 7 provider organizations, which comprised over 2,000 specialist 
physicians. Other cohorts varied in the number of enrollees, PCPs, and specialists (Table 1).  
Characteristics of the control group were largely similar. Pre- and post-intervention 
comparisons between each cohort and control are shown in Table 2. There were 966,813 unique 
individuals enrolled for at least 1 year in the control group during the study period. Average age, 
sex, and risk score before and after the AQC were similar between the two groups. The control 
had a higher average cost-sharing percentage compared to the AQC cohorts.  
 
3.2.  Spending 
 
3.2.1.  2009 AQC Cohort 
 
Figure 3 shows the unadjusted spending trends for the 2009 AQC cohort and control. In 
unadjusted analysis, the 2009 AQC cohort spent on average $789.35 per enrollee per quarter in 26 
 
the pre-intervention period (2006-2008) and $913.15 in the post-intervention period (2009-2012) 
for a difference of $123.80 per enrollee per quarter, while the control group spent $731.61 in the 
pre-intervention period and $911.40 post-intervention for a difference of $179.79 per enrollee 
pre quarter. The unadjusted difference between the changes (the difference-in-difference result) 
was -$55.99 per enrollee per quarter (Table 3). This suggests the 2009 AQC cohort experienced, 
on average, a decrease in spending during the 4 years after the intervention compared to before 
the intervention, relative to what the control group experienced.  
In adjusted analysis using the multivariate regression, the AQC was associated with an 
average 4-year change in spending of -$62.21 per enrollee per quarter, representing a 6.8 percent 
decrease (p<0.001) in the average level of spending compared to the pre-intervention level, 
relative to the control group. This represents the statistical estimate of the policy effect over the 
first 4 years. Pre-intervention trends were not statistically different between the AQC and control 
group (-$4.57, p=0.86), suggesting that differences in post-intervention spending were not driven 
by inherently different trajectories of spending. This was robust to the inclusion or exclusion of 
covariates in the model. No significant changes in the DxCG risk score were associated with the 
AQC (-0.0015, p=0.57), suggesting that coding behavior did not meaningfully impact the results. 
Figure 4 decomposes average spending by site and type of care: inpatient facility and 
professional as well as outpatient facility and professional. This unadjusted analysis suggests that 
the slowing of spending in the 2009 cohort was most pronounced in the outpatient setting rather 
than the inpatient setting. Within outpatient spending, facility spending accounted for the largest 
raw decrease relative to control, as the two trends intersect each other in late 2011. In contrast, 
trends in inpatient spending were similar between AQC and control in the raw plots (Figure 4). 
In adjusted analysis, decomposition of average 4-year spending by site and type of care 
similarly showed that changes in spending were largest in the outpatient facility setting (-$48.67 27 
 
per enrollee per quarter, p<0.001). The decrease in inpatient facility spending was not 
statistically significant (-$3.32 per enrollee per quarter, p=0.52). The decrease in outpatient 
professional spending was -$15.35 per enrollee per quarter, p=0.004). Inpatient professional 
spending did not incur a statistically significant change on average in the first 4 years of the 
AQC ($0.40 per enrollee per quarter, p=0.82) (Table 3).  
Unadjusted decomposition of the 2009 AQC cohort by prior risk contracting experience 
is illustrated in Figure 5. In adjusted analysis, the Prior-Risk subgroup, which comprised about 
88 percent of the cohort, had an average 4-year change in spending of -$57.61 per enrollee per 
quarter (-6.3 percent, p<0.001), while the No-Prior-Risk subgroup saw a change of -$68.66 (-7.7 
percent, p<0.001). For both subgroups, the outpatient facility setting accounted for the largest 
decreases in spending (p<0.001) (Table 3). Consistent with the aggregate results above, inpatient 
professional spending did not change significantly for either subgroup. The Prior-Risk subgroup 
saw an insignificant change in inpatient facility spending of -$3.28 per enrollee per quarter over 
the 4 years (p=0.52), as did the No-Prior-Risk subgroup ($5.26 per enrollee per quarter, p=0.58). 
Both subgroups had significant decreases in outpatient professional spending of -$11.87 (p=0.02) 
and -$23.13 (p<0.001) over the 4 years, respectively (Table 3).  
 
3.2.2.  2010 AQC Cohort 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the unadjusted spending trends for the 2010 AQC cohort and control. 
In unadjusted analysis, the 2010 AQC cohort spent on average $876.42 per enrollee per quarter 
in the pre-intervention period (2006-2009) and $954.74 in the post-intervention period (2010-
2012) for a difference of $78.32 per enrollee per quarter, while the control group spent $772.71 
in the same pre-intervention period and $919.45 post-intervention for a difference of $146.74 per 28 
 
enrollee pre quarter. The difference-in-difference change in spending associated with the AQC 
was -$68.42 per enrollee per quarter (Table 4).  
Similar to the 2009 AQC cohort (Figure 3), the 2010 AQC cohort also demonstrated a 
large decline in spending after the intervention (in this case, 2010-2012) relative to control. This 
decline in spending appeared more similar to that of the No-Prior-Risk subgroup in the 2009 
cohort, which is consistent with the fact that the 2010 AQC cohort is entirely comprised of 
physician groups that joined the AQC from fee-for-service contracts. In essence, the 2010 AQC 
cohort is a No-Prior-Risk cohort. Thus, the most analogous comparison between the 2009 and 
2010 cohorts comes from using the No-Prior-Risk subgroup in the 2009 cohort (Figure 5).  
In adjusted analysis for the 2010 cohort, the AQC was associated with an average 3-year 
change in spending of -$81.92 per enrollee per quarter, or a 8.8 percent decrease (p<0.001) in the 
level of spending compared to pre-intervention and relative to control (Table 4). Pre-intervention 
trends between AQC and control were statistically different (-$14.51, p=0.008). Thus, unlike in 
the 2009 AQC cohort, this suggests that 2010 cohort spending was growing at a slower rate prior 
to the intervention, compared to control. Figure 6 illustrates with this finding.  
Figure 7 decomposes 2010 cohort spending by site and type of care. Consistent with the 
2009 cohort findings, the slowing of spending in the 2010 cohort was driven by the outpatient 
setting rather than the inpatient setting. Similarly, outpatient facility spending saw the largest 
decline relative to control, with the two trends also intersecting each other by late 2011. Adjusted 
analyses supported these raw results. Decomposition of average 4-year spending by site and type 
of care similarly showed that changes in spending were largest in the outpatient facility setting (-
$80.98 per enrollee per quarter, p<0.001). Decreases in outpatient professional spending were 
smaller but also statistically significant (-$17.86 per enrollee per quarter, p=0.007). The 2010 29 
 
cohort did not demonstrate a statistically significant change in inpatient professional spending or 
in inpatient facility spending. 
 
3.2.3.  2011 AQC Cohort 
 
Unadjusted spending in the 2011 AQC cohort and control is shown in Figure 8. The 2011 
cohort consists of a single large provider organization, whose spending trend prior to 2011 shows 
greater variation compared to the relatively smoother trends in the earlier cohorts. Spending in 
the pre-intervention period increased modestly between 2006-2008 and more so in 2009-2010. 
Unadjusted analysis shows that the 2011 AQC cohort spent on average $1044.91 per enrollee per 
quarter before the AQC (2006-2010) and $1070.56 after entering the AQC (2011-2012), with a 
difference of $25.65 per enrollee per quarter. Meanwhile, the control group spent $797.84 pre-
intervention and $920.67 post-intervention, with the difference being $122.83 per enrollee pre 
quarter. The resulting difference-in-difference change in spending associated with the AQC was 
-$97.18 per enrollee per quarter (Table 5). 
Adjusted analysis in the 2011 cohort demonstrated that the AQC was associated with an 
average 2-year change of -$97.10 per enrollee per quarter in spending, equivalent to -9.1 percent, 
p<0.001 (Table 5). Pre-intervention trends between intervention and control were not statistically 
different (-$3.70, p=0.52). Again, this suggests that the 2011 cohort spending was growing at a 
similar rate prior to the intervention as that of the control group.  
The unadjusted decomposition of 2011 AQC cohort spending is summarized in Table 5. 
Consistent with earlier AQC cohorts, outpatient facility spending accounted for the largest share 
of the spending change (-$28.27 per enrollee per quarter, or -8.2 percent, p=0.03). The 2011 
cohort also demonstrated statistically significant spending decreases in outpatient professional 30 
 
services (-$22.65 per enrollee per quarter, p<0.001). Changes in inpatient professional and 
inpatient facility spending were not statistically significant (Table 5).  
 
3.2.4.  2012 AQC Cohort 
 
The 2012 AQC cohort had the longest pre-intervention period in the study (2006-2011) 
and 1 year of post-intervention data (2010). Its unadjusted spending along with control is shown 
in Figure 9. The 2012 cohort comprised 5 provider organizations, whose average spending trend 
prior to 2012 was increasing. Unadjusted analysis shows that the 2012 AQC cohort spent on 
average $981.06 per enrollee per quarter before the AQC and $1022.80 after the AQC, with a 
difference of $41.74. The control group spent $817.96 before the AQC and $921.01 after, with a 
difference of $103.05 per enrollee pre quarter. The unadjusted difference-in-difference change in 
spending associated with the AQC was -$61.31 per enrollee per quarter (Table 6). 
In adjusted analysis, the AQC was associated with a year-1 spending change of -$59.39 
per enrollee per quarter (-5.8 percent, p=0.04) (Table 6). The pre-intervention trend in the 2012 
AQC cohort was modestly higher than in control ($7.93, p=0.05) on average over the 6 years. If 
interpreted as a meaningful difference, this suggests that the 2012 AQC cohort would have had 
to overcome a higher baseline growth rate to generate a spending decrease. 
The adjusted decomposition of 2012 AQC cohort spending is summarized in Table 6. 
Outpatient facility spending again explained the largest share of the spending change (-$95.05 
per enrollee per quarter, p<0.001). The 2012 cohort saw a statistically significant increase in 
outpatient professional spending ($14.26, p=0.049). Inpatient professional and facility spending 
also increased after the AQC relative to control, although estimates were insignificant (Table 6). 
This suggests that changes in outpatient facility spending were partly offset in this cohort. 31 
 
 
3.2.5.  Sensitivity Analyses 
 
The changes in spending associated with the AQC for each cohort in each year are shown 
in Table 7. All results were derived from models using the 8 Northeastern states as controls. 
Thus, magnitudes for 2009 and 2010 findings (first 2 years of the contract) may differ from those 
of prior AQC evaluations, which used non-AQC BCBSMA enrollees as the control group.
20,22 
Weighted across the cohorts, average AQC-associated savings by year were 2.4 percent in 2009, 
3.1 percent in 2010, 8.4 percent in 2011, and 10.0 percent in 2012. These savings were scaled 
from ﾠdollar ﾠestimates ﾠinto ﾠpercentages ﾠby ﾠdividing ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠgiven ﾠyear’s ﾠclaims spending. They are 
compared to the aggregate magnitudes of incentive payments in a later section below.  
Sensitivity analyses for these results are shown in Table 8. In section A of the table, these 
sensitivity analyses tested the robustness of main results against various changes in the model. 
Column 1 reproduces the main coefficient of interest (average quarterly change in spending 
associated with the AQC over the first 4 years of the contract, using the 2009 cohort vs. control 
comparison). The remaining columns show the same coefficient in alternative scenarios: (2) 
percent cost sharing in place of plan fixed effects; (3) exclusion of plan type fixed effects; (4-5) 
exclusion of state or plan fixed effects; (6) exclusion of state and plan fixed effects; (7) exclusion 
of age and sex; (8) exclusion of risk score; (9) exclusion of age, sex, and risk score; (10) and 
exclusion of age, sex, and risk score with inclusion of plan fixed effects. Cost sharing is derived 
by calculating the percent of spending paid by the enrollee out of pocket for the 10 most frequent 
services and then averaging those percentages by plan. This is a reflection of plan generosity.  
In section B of Table 8, sensitivity analyses tested robustness against changes in the 
variables or sample. Column 1 is again the main coefficient of interest. The remaining columns 32 
 
show the following modifications: (2) risk scores in deciles rather than a continuous variable; (3) 
excluding cost sharing from spending; (4) including prescription drug spending; (5) prospective 
risk score lagged by 1 year; (6) restricting to continuous enrollees over 7 years during the study 
period; (7) quarterly model at the enrollee level. Importantly, because there were some concerns 
that unobserved secular factors in Massachusetts could have contributed to the results, columns 
(8-11) tested alternative control groups that were possible to construct using the available data. 
These alternative control groups have drawbacks, but were nevertheless tested and compared to 
the main results. Column (8) uses HMO only controls from the 8 Northeastern states. This group 
fails to capture all enrollees in plans comparable to the AQC, which require designating a PCP 
and have incentives for receiving care in network. Also, this group had significant differences in 
pre-intervention spending trends compared to the AQC. Column (9) uses Massachusetts control 
subjects only from the Truven (Marketscan) dataset. This group is not ideal because it contains 
BCBSMA (treatment) enrollees as well; I could not separate BCBSMA enrollees from Harvard 
Pilgrim, Tufts, or other private payers in MA due to the absence of payer IDs in the Truven data 
for confidentiality. Moreover, this control group had significant differences in pre-intervention 
spending trends relative to the AQC. Column (10) uses non-AQC BCBSMA controls (enrollees 
whose providers had not joined the AQC by 2012). This is not an ideal control group because the 
remaining providers in non-incentive contracts were small, rural practices that received lower fee 
updates from BCBSMA as a consequence of remaining in fee-for-service. Moreover, this control 
group also had significant differences in pre-intervention spending trends relative to the AQC. 
The Massachusetts only control groups are also susceptible to spillover effects. Column (11) uses 
nationwide controls: a 10% random sample of enrollees in the 49 non-Massachusetts states in the 
Truven data. As with the main control group, national controls are susceptible to other factors in 
Massachusetts affecting the results. However, this control group does not contaminate controls 33 
 
with treatment subjects and is less susceptible to AQC spillover effects within Massachusetts. Of 
note, similar to the baseline control group, the national control group demonstrated no significant 
differences in pre-intervention spending trends relative to the AQC. Overall, sensitivity analyses 
generally supported the main estimates. 
 
3.3.  Utilization 
 
A decrease in spending attributable to the AQC could be driven either by a decrease in 
prices or a decrease in utilization (volume). Analyses on the 2009 AQC cohort showed that in 
year 1, this cohort achieved savings through lower prices, rather than through lowering volume. 
The lower prices were achieved through referring patients to lower priced providers. By the end 
of year 2, savings continued to be driven by lower prices through using less expensive providers, 
but decreases in utilization also began to surface in year 2. Roughly one-third of the savings were 
attributable to decreases in utilization, with about two-thirds due to lower prices. 
Direct analyses of utilization are available only through the first 2 post-intervention years 
for the 2009 AQC cohort. These analyses were focused on several areas of technology-intensive 
services: cardiovascular services, imaging services, and orthopedic services.
42 They used models 
with the volume of services as the dependent variable. In the first two years of the contract, the 
2009 cohort saw a decrease in the volume of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) relative to 
control (Figure 10A). Utilization of coronary artery bypass surgery, aneurysm repair, and carotid 
endarterectomy did not demonstrate statistically significant changes between the 2009 cohort and 
control (Figures 10A, 10B). Table 8 shows the unadjusted and adjusted changes in utilization for 
these services between the 2009 AQC cohort and control. Utilization of imaging services did not 
demonstrate statistically significant changes associated with the AQC (Figure 11, Table 9). The 34 
 
volume of orthopedic services, in terms of knee replacements and hip replacements, also did not 
show any statistically significant changes associated with the AQC (Figure 12, Table 9).  
In the analysis of average 4-year spending changes, the base model using standardized 
prices produced an average spending decrease of -$24.35 (p<0.001) associated with the AQC. 
Compared to the estimate above from using observed prices, this represents 49 percent of the 
magnitude, suggesting that just under half of the spending decrease over the first 4 years was 
attributable to decreases in utilization. The rest (51 percent) of the estimated policy effect is 
attributable to decreases in prices.  
 
3.4.  Quality 
 
3.3.1.  Process Measures 
 
Table 10 shows the changes in performance on process quality measures for the 2009 
AQC cohort in the first two years of the contract compared to control. Unadjusted results were 
calculated as the percent of eligible populations for a particular quality measure who met the pre-
defined performance threshold for the measure (for example, annual eye exams for patients with 
diabetes). Difference-in-differences results are interpreted as the percentage-point change among 
eligible enrollees who met the performance threshold associated with the AQC. Adjusted results 
in Table 10 were derived using BCBSMA enrollees as controls in a linear, multivariate enrollee-
level model through the first two years of the contract. Sensitivity analyses using logistic models 
did not meaningfully change the results. Adjusted results were decomposed into year-1 and year-
2 effects to evaluate the initial trends in the AQC-associated changes. Results for the 3 aggregate 
measures were calculated by pooling the individual measures (see Methods).  35 
 
The percent of eligible enrollees who met chronic care management quality performance 
increased from 79.1 percent before the AQC (2006-2008) to 83.3 percent after the AQC (2009-
2010) in the 2009 AQC cohort. The percent of eligible enrollees in the BCBSMA controls saw a 
smaller increase from 79.7 to 80.0 percent. Adjusted results show that the AQC was associated 
with a 3.7 percentage-point improvement in aggregate chronic care management over the first 2 
years (p<0.001). The year-1 effect was a 2.6 percentage-point increase (p<0.001), and the year-2 
effect was a 4.7 percentage-point increase (p<0.001). This aggregate result comprised component 
improvements in cardiovascular LDL cholesterol screening and diabetes care (4 measures); one 
component that did not demonstrate a significant improvement in the first two years was short-
term and maintenance prescription measures for patients with depression (Table 10).  
The quality of adult preventive care improved on average 0.4 percentage points over the 
first two years (p=0.004). It did not show a statistically significant improvement in year 1 (a 0.1 
percentage-point change, p=0.67), but improved significantly in year-2 (a 0.7 percentage-point 
improvement, p<0.001). This aggregate result was primarily driven by breast cancer screening 
and by withhold of antibiotics for acute bronchitis (Table 10).  
Pediatric quality also improved over the first 2 years, averaging a 1.3 percentage-point 
increase (p<0.001). The year-1 improvement was 0.7 percentage points (p=0.001), and the year-2 
improvement was 1.9 percentage points (p<0.001). Individual measures including well care for 
babies, children, and adolescents, as well as chlamydia screening for adolescents, contributed to 
the aggregate improvement. Appropriate testing for pharyngitis saw a decrease associated with 
the AQC, as a result of greater improvements in the control group. Withhold of antibiotics for 
acute bronchitis among children also did not contribute to the improvement (Table 10).  
After 2 years, adjusted analyses using the enrollee-level model were not possible given 
the lack of BCBSMA controls. Thus, unadjusted weighted averages of performance on process 36 
 
measures by each of the 4 AQC cohorts in each of 6 years (2007-2012) are shown in a series of 
figures (enrollee-level data were not available in 2006). Figure 13A shows performance on the 
aggregate chronic care management measure, showing a monotonic improvement for the 2009 
and 2010 AQC cohorts. Without enrollee-level control data, it is not known to what degree their 
changes in 2011 and 2012 relative to pre-intervention are attributable to the AQC in a statistical 
sense. There is some variation across the AQC cohorts in their performance levels.  
Figure 13B shows performance on the aggregate adult preventive care measure. Again, 
variation is noted across the 4 AQC cohorts, with an overall trend towards improvement. Figure 
13C summarizes the aggregate pediatric care measure. With rare exception, there is also a trend 
towards improvement across the cohorts.  
For the 2009 AQC cohort, average 4-year changes in unadjusted process quality relative 
to HEDIS national averages are summarized in Table 11. A continued improvement in the last 2 
years of the contract is evident, although these results are not statistically adjusted. Table 11 also 
summarizes average changes in unadjusted process quality for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 cohorts 
over the duration of their contracts up through 2012, relative to HEDIS national averages.  
 
3.3.2.  Outcome Measures 
 
Descriptive analysis of performance on outcome measures for the 2009 AQC cohort is 
shown in Table 12. The first 4 columns show performance on the 5 individual measures and the 
aggregate measure annually in 2009-2012. The right 2 columns show a comparison panel using 
HEDIS national averages in 2011-2012. In general, the 2009 AQC cohort performed better than 
national averages. This analysis comprised only unadjusted averages; differences between the 
2009 AQC cohort and the HEDIS data cannot be interpreted as an AQC effect, because there 37 
 
was no enrollee-level statistical analysis that could be undertaken on outcome measures. Figure 
14 plots the 2009 AQC cohort against the HEDIS national average for the composite outcome 
score across 2006-2012. Relative to the national average, this AQC cohort experienced a steady 
improvement in outcomes, although the interpretation is again descriptive rather than causal. 
 
3.5.  Cumulative Payouts 
 
An important distinction must be made between decreases in medical spending associated 
with the AQC, as demonstrated by the above results, and changes in cumulative payouts from the 
insurer. Medical spending in these analyses was calculated from actual claims filed by providers 
to BCBSMA. For each enrollee-quarter observation in the data, medical spending was the sum of 
claims filed by providers. Thus, it reflects the amount of care provided to beneficiaries, but does 
not include shared savings surpluses, quality bonuses, or infrastructure bonuses received by the 
provider organizations in the AQC. In other words, a difference-in-difference result that ties the 
AQC to a decrease in medical spending does not necessarily mean that overall payouts from the 
insurer fell in a given year.  
Total payouts, including shared savings, quality bonuses, and infrastructure support, 
exceeded savings on claims in the first 2 years, reflecting upfront investment costs to encourage 
participation. This pattern continued into 2011, with a smaller gap, but reversed in the 2012, 
when claims savings exceeded incentive payments to generate a net savings (Table 7). By 2012, 
total payout growth for the AQC (claims and incentive payments combined) was below the 
Massachusetts state spending target of 3.6% and below the projected spending based on controls. 
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4.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
After 4 years, the AQC was associated with decreased medical spending and improved 
quality of care for the 2009 AQC cohort. The growth rate of spending in this cohort slowed over 
the 4 years, evident in unadjusted analysis and supported by adjusted results, while performance 
on process and outcome quality measures steadily increased. Consistent with earlier work, AQC-
associated decreases in spending were concentrated in the outpatient facility setting, and savings 
in the No-Prior-Risk subgroup continued to be greater than those in the Prior-Risk subgroup. The 
proportion of average savings attributable to decreases in utilization, as opposed to decreases in 
price, approached 50 percent after the first 4 years. Spending results were not due to changes in 
coding behavior. Results were generally robust to sensitivity analyses.  
The 2010 AQC cohort, comprised of organizations entering from fee-for-service, also 
experienced a continued decrease in medical spending following from earlier work, although its 
pre-intervention spending trend was slower than control.
20,22 Year-1 and year-2 results from the 
2011 and 2012 cohort are largely consistent with those of the initial cohorts. In general, these 
results compare favorably with initial reports on ACO performance in the Medicare program and 
other ongoing ACO-type evaluations. Meanwhile, quality of care in the AQC cohorts largely 
improved across the years. Process measures improved in a statistically robust manner compared 
to control enrollees in the first two years, and continued to increase in later years as shown by 
unadjusted analysis. Unadjusted outcome measures improved relative to national averages. 
The spending and quality results observed among AQC groups as they progressed in the 
contract may serve as a useful benchmark for policymakers and organizations working towards 
moving the payment system away from fee-for-service. These results from the AQC, however, 
are still early, and are only representative of one payment model in one state. Nevertheless, they 39 
 
suggest that global payment implemented effectively within accountable care organizations may 
serve as a foundation for providers to begin slowing medical spending. The relationship between 
payers and provider organizations in the ACO paradigm will be crucial for success. Alignment of 
the incentives to control spending and improve quality will likely be important for collaboration 
between these parties. For example, the exchange of claims data and progress reports in real time 
showing spending and quality trends for organizations compared to peers may allow insurers and 
providers to work together on targeting areas of overuse and low-value care. 
 
4.1.  Limitations 
 
The main concern is that other factors in Massachusetts could have influenced spending 
and quality during the study period. The 2012 Massachusetts payment reform legislation created 
the state Health Policy Commission and broadly encouraged ACO adoption. Also, global budget 
contracts with other payers may have spillover effects on the BCBSMA population. However, 
reforms in Massachusetts mostly postdate the study ﾠperiod. ﾠMoreover, ﾠMedicare’s ﾠPioneer ﾠACO ﾠ
program was launched in 2012; Tufts Health Plan and Harvard Pilgrim Health Plan began global 
payment contracts in 2012-2013. Therefore, although the findings for 2012 may be susceptible to 
spillovers, and anticipatory effects from other contracts may also play a role, prior analyses using 
internal controls, consistency of the sensitivity analyses, and qualitative findings from provider 
interviews suggest that the AQC played a meaningful role.
20-22 
There are a number of other limitations. First, selection bias is a concern as participation 
in the AQC was voluntary. The lack of differences in pre-intervention trends between AQC and 
control attenuates this concern, suggesting that spending trajectories were not already diverging 
prior to the AQC. That most provider organizations in Massachusetts entered the AQC by year-4 40 
 
further attenuates this concern. Nevertheless, a potential selection bias cannot be eliminated, as 
there remain unobserved factors that may have influenced participation as well as spending. 
Second, internal validity is threatened if AQC organizations also entered global payment 
contracts with other payers, which may have spillover effects on the care of BCBSMA patients.
43 
Medicare’s ﾠPioneer ﾠACO ﾠprogram ﾠwas ﾠlaunched ﾠin ﾠ2012;; ﾠTufts ﾠHealth ﾠPlan ﾠand ﾠHarvard ﾠPilgrim ﾠ
Health Plan began global payment contracts in 2012-2013. Therefore, our findings for 2012 may 
be susceptible to spillovers. Anticipatory effects from these other contracts may also play a role. 
Internal validity is also threatened if control states underwent payment reform. However, 
we know of no broad-scale payment reforms among large private insurers in these states. Some 
states, such as Rhode Island, piloted medical home interventions, but thus far they have not been 
shown to significantly affected spending.
44,45 Nevertheless, payment reform was an active issue 
in many states, especially during the later years of our study period. We cannot identify specific 
providers or insurers in the Truven data, preventing us from rigorously testing these concerns. 
However, to the extent that any payment reforms occurred in control states, their effects would 
be minimized by pooling all these states. To the extent that payment reforms might have slowed 
spending in control states, our estimated AQC-associated savings would be conservative.  
The key question is whether our control group serves as a good counterfactual. We 
believe the lack of differences in pre-intervention trends and pooling of control states boost the 
fidelity of the control group. Moreover, this control group, which differed from that of prior 
AQC evaluations which used non-AQC BCBSMA enrollees, generated similar year-1 and year-2 
savings in the 2009 and 2010 cohorts compared to results using those prior controls.
20,22 
Third, results may not generalize to ACOs in Medicare. Most Medicare ACO contracts 
are 1-sided with shared savings only. Moreover, prices in Medicare are largely uniform rather 
than negotiated, so savings for Medicare would require reductions in utilization or shifts to less 41 
 
expensive settings (rather than referrals to less expensive providers). Similarly, results may not 
generalize to other states, which face different constraints and challenges.
46,47,48,49,50 
Fourth, our quality analyses were descriptive, rather than derived from a statistical model. 
Earlier work using models analogous to our spending analysis showed significant improvements 
in all 3 dimensions of process quality, consistent with our descriptive results. Our measures also 
do not capture all dimensions of quality. Process measures are primary care-centered, while the 5 
outcome measures leave numerous important outcomes unmeasured. 
Finally, the distinction between decreases in medical spending and changes in cumulative 
payouts deserves emphasis. As described above, the decrease in medical spending in early years 
of the AQC were likely exceeded by shared savings, quality bonuses, and infrastructure payouts 
combined. This was not inconsistent with the design of the AQC, which sets budgets based on 
actuarial projections to lower spending over the multi-year contract, taking anticipated quality 
bonuses and other payments into account. These different payments can be viewed as the initial 
investments by BCBSMA to help motivate provider organizations to move away from pure fee-
for-service and embark on delivery system changes to improve the value of care. Obviously, the 
long-term success of the model depends on how the budget and its growth rate are set, but it also 
depends on how well organizations can reduce waste within the budgets they take on. 
 
4.2.  ACOs Going Forward 
 
In the ACO paradigm, physician organizations face the challenge of changing practice 
patterns on the ground. After insurance expansion and payment reform from insurers, changing 
the practice of medicine to control spending and improve quality may appropriately be thought 
of as the third phase of health care reform.
51 Under global payment, ACOs are asked to manage 42 
 
population health, coordinate care among providers of different specialties, and function as a 
medical home for its patients. These are substantial challenges for even large organizations with 
experience in these domains, not to mention smaller physician groups joining together to become 
new ACOs. From a scientific standpoint, little is known about how ACOs can teach teamwork to 
its physicians, about how they can institute joint accountability across specialties, and about how 
they can become organizations that focus on value rather than volume.  
Little is systematically known about how to change the culture of medicine in a palatable 
way for physicians in an ACO. Organizations such as the Mayo Clinic, Geisinger Health System, 
Kaiser Permanente, Intermountain Healthcare, and Virginia Mason have implemented innovative 
payment and delivery systems. Other provider organizations such as the Southcentral Foundation 
in Alaska have been able to produce impressive results on utilization and quality. Together, these 
organizations’ ﾠexperiences in recent decades suggest that changing the culture of medicine is key 
for achieving cost and quality goals. Each has approached cultural change differently, but stories 
from these organizations have several common themes.  
First is leadership. ACOs that succeed on cost and quality tend to have leaders who can 
motivate an organizational ethos that complements the professional ethos of medicine. Under a 
global payment contract, clinicians in an organization are truly in it together. When a physician 
does not order an unnecessary test, savings accrue to the organization. When a provider calls a 
patient and works with him or her to prevent an unnecessary visit to the emergency department, 
the entire organization benefits. When patients are satisfied with their care, the organization is 
rewarded together. Therefore, successful leadership seems to motivate members in an ACO to 
feel invested in one another. It is able to unite providers in a shared vision and keep them going 
forward through difficult tradeoffs. For example, if an organization decides to invest more of its 43 
 
resources under global payment to population health and prevention, leaders will need to secure 
buy-in from physicians across the organization.  
In addition to leadership, incentives are certainly important. Innovations in payment are a 
theme among physician organizations that have successfully lowered spending and improved the 
quality of care in certain clinical contexts. A focus on the collective value of care for patients is a 
helpful foundation for the ACO. It encourages clinicians to think about the cost of care, how they 
coordinate care with one another, consult each another, and refer patients to each another, all of 
which affect resource utilization. Both financial and nonfinancial incentives that reward value, 
particularly through teamwork, could be flexibly designed by an organization to suit its culture 
under a global payment. Several of the organizations mentioned above have improved the value 
of their care with physicians on salary, with creative incentives to motivate physicians to care 
about their colleagues' patients as well as their own.
52 Other organizations have found ways to 
motivate team performance around common clinical scenarios.
53 As the ACO paradigm moves 
forward, a greater understanding of behavioral economics and the sociology of physician referral 
networks by ACO leaders may enable them to creatively design additional incentives.
54,55,56 
Furthermore, engaging patients in the clinical decision-making process and in practicing 
prevention ﾠoutside ﾠthe ﾠdoctor’s ﾠoffice can be a part of successful cultural change. For example, 
the Mayo clinic uses a number of patient family advisory committees, which listen to patient and 
family concerns and involves patients in establishing practice guidelines. ACOs put physicians 
and patients on the same team. Reducing the supply of unnecessary care and reducing demand 
for ﾠit ﾠare ﾠequally ﾠbeneficial ﾠfor ﾠan ﾠorganization’s ﾠglobal ﾠbudget. ﾠHowever, ﾠfor population health 
management to work, the population likely needs to feel empowered and connected to providers 
in the organization. 
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4.3.  Suggestions for Future Work and Summary 
 
Research on the AQC may be informative for the physician and health policy community 
by providing an example of changes in spending and quality associated with a broad-scale global 
payment initiative. Future work on the AQC should further explore changes in utilization in the 
later years of the contract, which seem to explain an increasing share of the savings. Changes in 
volume in specific service lines, following on the work with the first 2 years for the 2009 cohort 
and describing what happens in the other cohorts, would be a meaningful extension to this work.  
Results from the first 4 years of the AQC suggest that global payment within accountable 
care organizations may be an effective tool for slowing the growth rate of health care spending 
and improving the quality of care. A multi-year global budget with shared savings and shared 
risk may provide physician organizations an incentive to embark on delivery system reforms to 
improve the value of care. Robust quality measures tied to substantial quality incentives could 
serve as an effective buffer against stinting, at least in areas that quality measures target. Despite 
the promise of global payment, challenges remain for physician organizations across the country 
adopting this type of payment model. The ability of payment reform to improve the value of U.S. 
health care depends on whether provider organizations can successfully change practice patterns 
and the culture of medicine in an increasingly constrained health care economy. 
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Figure 1. Accountable Care Organizations in the Medicare Program* 
 
 
 
 
* The Affordable Care Act authorized the creation of accountable care organizations (ACOs) in 
Medicare. ﾠThe ﾠfirst ﾠACOs ﾠwere ﾠlaunched ﾠin ﾠJanuary, ﾠ2012, ﾠcomprising ﾠ32 ﾠadvanced ﾠor ﾠ“Pioneer” ﾠ
physician organizations that took on a 2-sided ACO contract with shared savings and shared risk 
for large populations of Medicare beneficiaries. Since then, 4 waves of Shared Savings Program 
ACOs have been launched, consisting of organizations in 1-sided contracts with shared savings 
but no shared risk during the initial contracting period. In total, as of January, 2014, the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that there are 360 ACOs in the U.S. serving about 
5.3 million Medicare beneficiaries. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of Health Care Reform in Massachusetts* 
 
 
 
 
* In 2006, Massachusetts embarked on a coverage expansion that increased the rate of insurance 
in the state to over 97 percent. The ensuing years saw continued growth in health care spending, 
prompting state lawmakers, the governor, private insurers, and other stakeholders to engage in an 
effort to slow the growth of health care spending. The Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) was 
implemented in 2009, with 7 physician organizations entering the contract in the first year. By 
2012, about 85 percent of the physicians in the state who work with Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts had entered the AQC. Importantly, the AQC took place in this broader context of 
state efforts to slow health care spending growth. 
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Figure 3. Unadjusted Spending: 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
 
 
 
* Unadjusted spending per enrollee per quarter. The control group comprises commercial 
enrollees in employer-sponsored HMO and POS plans across 8 Northeastern states: CT, ME, 
NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, and VT. 
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Figure 4. 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Decomposition of Unadjusted Average Medical 
Spending By Type and Site of Care.* 
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Figure 5. 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Decomposition of Unadjusted Average Medical 
Spending By Organizational Prior Risk Contracting Experience.* 
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Figure 6. 2010 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Unadjusted Average Medical Spending Per 
Enrollee Per Quarter.* 
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Figure 7. 2010 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Decomposition of Unadjusted Average Medical 
Spending By Type and Site of Care.* 
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Figure 8. 2011 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Unadjusted Average Medical Spending Per 
Enrollee Per Quarter.* 
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Figure 9. 2012 AQC Cohort vs. Control: Unadjusted Average Medical Spending Per 
Enrollee Per Quarter.* 
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Figure 10. Utilization of Cardiovascular Services, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
A. Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery and Percutaneous Coronary Intervention 
 
 
 
B.  Aneurysm Repair and Carotid Endarterectomy, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
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Figure 11. Utilization of Imaging Services, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
A. Utilization of Standard Imaging and Ultrasound, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
 
 
B. Computed Tomography and Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
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Figure 12. Utilization of Orthopedic Services, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
Figure 13. Process Quality by AQC Cohort, Aggregate Results 2007-2012 
A. Chronic Care Management* 
 
* Unadjusted performance on chronic care management quality measures for all AQC cohorts and control. This 
aggregate measure is a weighted average of 7 individual process measures: cardiovascular low-density lipoprotein 
(LDL) cholesterol screening, 4 measures for enrollees with diabetes (glycated hemoglobin testing, eye exam, LDL 
cholesterol screening, and nephrology screening), and 2 measures for depression care (short-term prescription and 
maintenance prescription). 
 
B. Adult Preventive Care* 
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* This aggregate measure is a weighted average of 5 individual measures: breast cancer screening, cervical cancer 
screening, colorectal cancer screening, chlamydia screening for enrollees 21–24 years of age, and no antibiotics for 
acute bronchitis. 
 
C. Pediatric Care* 
 
* This aggregate measure is a weighted average of 6 individual measures: Appropriate testing for pharyngitis, 
chlamydia screening for enrollees 16–20 years of age, no antibiotics for upper respiratory infection, and 3 measures 
for well child visits (babies <15 months of age, children 3–6 years of age, and adolescents). 
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Figure 14. Outcome Quality, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. HEDIS (2007-2012)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Outcome quality consisted of 5 measures. For patients with diabetes: (1) hemoglobin A1c control ﾠ(≤9 ﾠ
percent), (2) low density liproprotein (LDL) cholesterol control (<100 mg/dL), (3) blood pressure control 
(<140/80 mmHg); for patients with cardiovascular diseases (4) blood pressure control (<140/90 mmHg), 
and (5) LDL control (<100 mg/dL). HEDIS is the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of AQC Cohorts* 
 
 
AQC Cohort  2009 
Cohort 
2010 
Cohort 
2011 
Cohort 
2012 
Cohort 
Control 
Group 
     
Enrollees*  490,167  177,312  97,754  583,002  966,813 
Age (yr)  34.1 ± 18.2  35.6 ± 17.9  41.1 ± 14.7  31.8 ± 19.1  33.7 ± 18.3 
Female sex (%)  52.2  52.1  52.3  51.9  50.0 
DxCG risk score
†           
Mean  1.03  1.09  1.26  1.03  1.00 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
0.48 
(0.19–1.07) 
0.51 
(0.21–1.15) 
0.61 
(0.25–1.35) 
0.46 
(0.19–1.05) 
0.41 
(0.16–1.04) 
Cost sharing (%)           
Mean  12.1  11.8  12.7  10.4  18.5 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
8.6 
(4.3–15.6) 
8.4 
(4.3–14.9) 
8.3 
(4.1–16.0) 
7.2 
(3.6–12.9) 
14.4 
(8.2–24.2) 
     
Provider Organizations  7  4  1  5  -- 
Primary care 
physicians 
1,151  469  420  2,115  -- 
Specialists  2,197  1,010  1,319  7,260  -- 
Affiliated hospitals  15  13  2  10  -- 
 
* Number of unique individuals enrolled for at least 1 year in the study period. Enrollees in AQC 
cohorts designated primary care physicians who practice in an organization that joined the AQC. 
The control group comprises commercially insured individuals in employer-sponsored plans 
across the 8 other Northeastern states (CT, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT). No data on provider 
organizations were available for controls. Age, sex, health risk score, and cost sharing are pooled 
across all enrollees in the entire study period. 
 
† The DxCG risk score is a measure of enrollee health status, calculated using coefficients from a 
statistical model from a national claims database that relates spending to ICD-9 diagnoses and 
demographic ﾠinformation. ﾠThe ﾠDxCG ﾠmethod ﾠis ﾠsimilar ﾠto ﾠMedicare’s ﾠHierarchical ﾠCondition ﾠ
Category risk scores system and is commonly used for risk adjustment purposes. It is a product 
of Verisk Health and a proprietary software. Across all enrollees in the study data, the average 
risk score was 1.03, and it ranged from 0.18 at the 25th percentile to 1.07 at the 75th percentile. 
Higher values mean higher expected spending.  
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Table 2. Characteristics of the Population: AQC Cohorts vs. Control 
 
 
 
A. 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
  2009 Cohort 
(N=490,167) 
Control 
(N=966,813) 
         
  Pre 
(2006-2008) 
Post 
(2009-2012) 
Pre 
(2006-2008) 
Post 
(2009-2012) 
         
Age (yr)  33.5 ± 18.2  34.6 ± 18.1  33.4 ± 18.2  33.9 ± 18.3 
Female sex (%)  52.3  52.1  50.1  50.0 
DxCG risk score         
Mean  0.97  1.07  0.94  1.05 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
0.45 
(0.19–1.00) 
0.50 
(0.21–1.11) 
0.39 
(0.14–0.97) 
0.43 
(0.16–1.09) 
Cost-sharing (%)         
Mean  10.9  13.0  17.5  19.3 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
8.3 
(4.1–14.5) 
8.8 
(4.4–16.6) 
13.9 
(7.9–22.8) 
14.9 
(8.4–25.4) 
 
 
 
B. 2010 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
  2010 Cohort 
(N=177,312) 
Control 
(N=966,813) 
         
  Pre 
(2006-2009) 
Post 
(2010-2012) 
Pre 
(2006-2009) 
Post 
(2010-2012) 
         
Age (yr)  34.5 ± 18.2  37.3 ± 17.5  33.5 ± 18.3  34.0 ± 18.3 
Female sex (%)  52.1  52.0  50.2  49.8 
DxCG risk score         
Mean  1.04  1.15  0.97  1.06 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
0.49 
(0.19–1.10) 
0.55 
(0.23–1.22) 
0.40 
(0.15–1.00) 
0.43 
(0.16–1.09) 
Cost-sharing (%)         
Mean  10.8  13.2  17.5  20.1 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
8.1 
(4.2–14.0) 
8.8 
(4.6–16.6) 
13.7 
(7.8–22.7) 
15.7 
(8.8–26.5) 
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C. 2011 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
  2011 Cohort 
(N=97,754) 
Control 
(N=966,813) 
         
  Pre 
(2006-2010) 
Post 
(2011-2012) 
Pre 
(2006-2010) 
Post 
(2011-2012) 
         
Age (yr)  41.1 ± 14.8  41.1 ± 14.7  33.6 ± 18.3  33.9 ± 18.2 
Female sex (%)  51.4  53.5  50.2  49.5 
DxCG risk score         
Mean  1.24  1.28  0.98  1.05 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
0.60 
(0.24–1.32) 
0.63 
(0.26–1.38) 
0.41 
(0.15–1.02) 
0.43 
(0.16–1.08) 
Cost-sharing (%)         
Mean  11.9  14.0  17.7  20.7 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
7.9 
(3.9–14.8) 
9.0 
(4.5–18.0) 
13.8 
(7.9–23.1) 
16.3 
(9.2–27.4) 
 
 
 
D. 2012 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
  2012 Cohort 
(N=583,002) 
Control 
(N=966,813) 
         
  Pre 
(2006-2011) 
Post 
(2012) 
Pre 
(2006-2011) 
Post 
(2012) 
         
Age (yr)  31.8 ± 19.1  31.9 ± 18.1  33.6 ± 18.0  33.9 ± 18.2 
Female sex (%)  52.0  51.4  50.1  49.5 
DxCG risk score         
Mean  1.03  1.06  1.00  1.03 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
0.46 
(0.19–1.05) 
0.48 
(0.20–1.09) 
0.41 
(0.16–1.03) 
0.42 
(0.16–1.06) 
Cost-sharing (%)         
Mean  10.0  13.0  18.2  20.8 
Median 
(Interquartile range) 
7.1 
(3.6–12.5) 
8.4 
(4.3–16.5) 
14.2 
(8.1–23.7) 
16.4 
(9.2–27.5) 
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Table 3. Change in Average Spending per Enrollee per Quarter, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
  AQC Enrollees in MA  Individuals in Control States   Between-Group Change 
  
Pre 
2006-08 
Post 
2009-12 
Change 
Pre 
2006-08 
Post 
2009-12 
Change  Unadjusted  Adjusted  P 
                   
2009 Cohort  789.35  913.15  123.8  731.61  911.40  179.79  -55.99  -62.21  <0.001 
Inpt Professional  39.15  45.16  6.01  42.54  50.72  8.18  -2.17  0.40  0.82 
Inpt Facility  149.05  185.58  36.53  156.33  201.10  44.76  -8.24  -3.32  0.524 
Outpt Professional  340.67  384.23  43.56  319.74  383.7  63.97  -20.4  -15.35  0.004 
Outpt Facility  219.91  252.65  32.74  213.00  275.88  62.88  -30.13  -48.67  <0.001 
                   
Prior Risk Subgroup  786.11  916.77  130.66  731.61  911.40  179.79  -49.13  -57.61  <0.001 
Inpt Professional  39.15  45.65  6.49  42.54  50.72  8.18  -1.69  0.40  0.815 
Inpt Facility  148.04  184.25  36.21  156.33  201.10  44.76  -8.56  -3.28  0.522 
Outpt Professional  343.41  392.76  49.35  319.74  383.70  63.97  -14.61  -11.87  0.019 
Outpt Facility  214.94  249.21  34.27  213.00  275.88  62.88  -28.61  -46.69  <0.001 64 
 
No Prior Risk Subgroup  817.97  890.51  72.53  731.61  911.40  179.79  -107.26  -68.66  <0.001 
Inpt Professional  39.10  42.10  3.00  42.54  50.72  8.18  -5.19  2.44  0.26 
Inpt Facility  157.92  193.90  35.98  156.33  201.10  44.76  -8.79  5.26  0.577 
Outpt Professional  316.57  330.87  14.30  319.74  383.70  63.97  -49.66  -23.13  <0.001 
Outpt Facility  263.76  274.21  10.45  213.00  275.88  62.88  -52.43  -64.25  <0.001 
 
All values are in units of dollars per quarter per enrollee. Adjusted results are derived from the statistical model as described in the 
Methods section. All values are inflation-adjusted to 2012 U.S. dollars. 
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Table 4. Change in Average Spending per Enrollee per Quarter, 2010 AQC Cohort vs. Control * 
 
  AQC Enrollees in MA  Individuals in Control States   Between-Group Change 
  
Pre 
2006-09 
Post 
2010-12 
Change 
Pre 
2006-09 
Post 
2010-12 
Change  Unadjusted  Adjusted  P 
                   
2010 Cohort  876.42  954.74  78.32  772.69  919.43  146.74  -68.42  -81.92  <0.001 
Inpt Professional  41.02  44.5  3.48  44.96  50.24  5.28  -1.81  1.23  0.583 
Inpt Facility  166.53  197.54  31.01  166.42  203.31  36.88  -5.88  6.21  0.409 
Outpt Professional  354.02  383.15  29.13  336.05  383.98  47.92  -18.79  -17.86  0.007 
Outpt Facility  274.18  283.81  9.63  225.25  281.9  56.65  -47.02  -80.98  <0.001 
 
* The 2010 AQC cohort comprises 4 physician organizations that entered the AQC from prior fee-for-service contracts. Thus, this cohort 
is analogous in its absence of prior risk contracting experience as the No-Prior-Risk subgroup of the 2009 AQC cohort. 
 
All values are in units of dollars per quarter per enrollee. Adjusted results are derived from the statistical model as described in the 
Methods section. All values are inflation-adjusted to 2012 U.S. dollars. 
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Table 5. Change in Average Spending per Enrollee per Quarter, 2011 AQC Cohort vs. Control * 
 
  AQC Enrollees in MA  Individuals in Control States   Between-Group Change 
  
Pre 
2006-10 
Post 
2011-12 
Change 
Pre 
2006-10 
Post 
2011-12 
Change  Unadjusted  Adjusted  P 
                   
2011 Cohort  1,044.91  1,070.56  25.65  797.82  920.64  122.83  -97.18  -97.10  <0.001 
Inpt Professional  51.26  50.3  -0.96  46.17  49.44  3.27  -4.23  -4.49  0.225 
Inpt Facility  215.15  211.39  -3.76  173.19  202.4  29.21  -32.97  -30.95  0.07 
Outpt Professional  399.85  414.1  14.25  344.94  382.54  37.6  -23.35  -22.65  0.013 
Outpt Facility  326.77  344.63  17.86  233.52  286.26  52.75  -34.89  -28.27  0.028 
 
All values are in units of dollars per quarter per enrollee. Adjusted results are derived from the statistical model as described in the 
Methods section. All values are inflation-adjusted to 2012 U.S. dollars. 
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Table 6. Change in Average Spending per Enrollee per Quarter, 2012 AQC Cohort vs. Control * 
 
  AQC Enrollees in MA  Individuals in Control States   Between-Group Change 
  
Pre 
2006-11 
Post 
2012 
Change 
Pre 
2006-11 
Post 
2012 
Change  Unadjusted  Adjusted  P 
                   
2012 Cohort  981.06  1,022.80  41.74  817.93  921.01  103.08  -61.33  -59.39  0.035 
Inpt Professional  45.11  43.46  -1.65  47.16  46.32  -0.84  -0.81  5.40  0.245 
Inpt Facility  173.87  183.26  9.39  177.81  203.58  25.77  -16.37  10.65  0.464 
Outpt Professional  386.48  417.73  31.25  352.48  373.01  20.53  10.72  14.26  0.049 
Outpt Facility  331.64  332.86  1.22  240.48  298.1  57.62  -56.4  -95.05  <0.001 
 
All values are in units of dollars per quarter per enrollee. Adjusted results are derived from the statistical model as described in the 
Methods section. All values are inflation-adjusted to 2012 U.S. dollars. 
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Table 7. Changes in Medical Spending and Total Payments Associated with the AQC by Cohort by Year 
 
Changes in Medical  2009  2010  2011  2012  Cohort Average 
Spending on Claims*  $  P  $  P  $  P  $  P  $  P  % 
2009 Cohort  -20.95  0.02  -30.06  0.02  -77.07  <0.001  -120.78  <0.001  -62.21  <0.001  -6.8 
2010 Cohort      -29.06  0.03  -85.49  <0.001  -131.21  <0.001  -81.92  <0.001  -8.8 
2011 Cohort          -76.96  0.001  -117.24  0.001  -97.10  <0.001  -9.1 
2012 Cohort     
       
-59.39  0.04  -59.39  0.04  -5.8 
Weighted Average  
Savings on Claims
† 
2.4% of current  
year FFS claims 
3.1% of current  
year FFS claims 
8.4% of current  
year FFS claims 
10.0% of current  
year FFS claims       
Incentive Payments  
to Providers
‡ 
6% to 9% of current  
year FFS claims 
9% to 12% of current  
year FFS claims 
10% to 13% of current  
year FFS claims 
6% to 9% of current  
year FFS claims       
Implication  BCBSMA payments to providers, including  
shared savings and bonuses for quality and  
infrastructure, exceeded savings on claims. 
Payments exceeded  
savings on claims, but 
by a smaller amount. 
Savings on claims  
exceeded payments, 
rendering net savings       
Scope of Adoption  
in Massachusetts 
About 20% of providers in the BCBSMA 
network had entered the AQC by 2010. 
33% of providers in  
the AQC by 2011 
75% of providers in  
the AQC by 2012       
 
* All values are per enrollee per quarter. Changes in spending on claims are from a difference-in-differences regression adjusted for 
covariates. Negative values represent savings. Cohort averages (right columns) are scaled into a percent by dividing a cohort’s ﾠaverage ﾠ
savings in the AQC by its average pre-AQC spending levels. Dollars are inflation-adjusted to 2012 U.S. dollars. 
† Average savings on claims weighted across cohorts in each year, scaled into percentages by dividing into the average fee-for-service 
(FFS) claims costs weighted across cohorts in each year. This percentage is directly comparable to incentive payments. 
‡ Incentive payments are the sum of shared savings under the budget, quality bonuses, and infrastructure bonuses. These values are 
expressed in percentage ranges due to the confidentiality of contracts between BCBSMA and provider organizations. 
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Table 8. Sensitivity Analyses, 2009 AQC Cohort vs. Control* 
 
A. Alterations to the Statistical Model
† 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
Base 
Model 
Percent 
Cost-sharing 
Omit Plan 
Type FE 
Omit 
State FE 
Omit 
Plan FE 
Omit State 
& Plan FE 
Omit Age 
& Sex 
Omit 
Risk Score 
Omit Age 
& Risk 
Prior with 
Plan FE 
                               
AQC*Post  -62.21***  -63.64***  -62.16***  -62.03***  -66.78***  -62.55***  -65.22***  -63.36***  -49.16***  -59.13*** 
 
(11.12)  (11.96)  (11.12)  (11.14)  (12.53)  (12.96)  (13.43)  (16.82)  (18.06)  (15.45) 
AQC  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Years  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Age  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
 
Y 
 
 
Sex  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
 
Y 
 
 
Risk  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
   
 
State FE  Y  Y  Y 
 
Y 
       
 
Plan type  Y  Y 
             
 
Plan FE  Y 
 
Y  Y 
         
Y 
% CS 
 
Y 
             
 
                   
 
Observations  3,715,260  3,715,048  3,715,260  3,715,260  3,715,260  3,715,260  3,715,260  3,729,885  3,729,885  3,729,885 
R-squared  0.529  0.528  0.529  0.529  0.528  0.528  0.527  0.015  0.001  0.005 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
† These sensitivity analyses test the robustness of our main results against various changes in the model. Column 1 reproduces the main coefficient 
of interest (average quarterly change in spending associated with the AQC over the first 4 years of the contract, using the 2009 cohort vs. control 
comparison). The remaining columns show the same coefficient in alternative scenarios: (2) percent cost sharing in place of plan fixed effects; (3) 
exclusion of plan type fixed effects; (4-5) exclusion of state or plan fixed effects; (6) exclusion of state and plan fixed effects; (7) exclusion of age 
and sex; (8) exclusion of risk score; (9) exclusion of age, sex, and risk score; (10) exclusion of age, sex, and risk score with inclusion of plan fixed 
effects. CS is cost sharing; it is derived by calculating the percent of spending paid by the enrollee out of pocket for the 10 most frequent services 
and then averaging those percentages by plan. This is a reflection of plan generosity. State FE are state fixed effects. Plan FE are plan fixed effects, 
where the plan is a unique plan number or benefit design issued by a given insurer, rather than a unique insurer. The statistical model is described 
in the text of the paper. 
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B. Alterations in Variables or Sample
†† 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  
Base 
Model 
Risk  
Score  
Deciles 
Net of  
Cost 
Sharing 
With  
Rx 
Drugs 
Risk 
Prosp 
Lagged 
Seven- 
Year 
Continu 
Enrollee- 
Quarter  
Model 
HMO  
Controls 
Only 
MA 
Only 
Controls 
Non-AQC 
BCBSMA 
Controls 
Non-MA 
USA 
Controls 
               
       
AQC*Post  -62.21***  -91.12***  -56.65***  -82.12***  -48.46**  -84.14**  -54.51***  -47.65***  -32.47**  -17.82***  -66.29** 
 
(11.12)  (11.89)  (10.84)  (14.15)  (18.52)  (17.24)  (13.11)  (11.14)  (13.41)  (6.19)  (28.66) 
AQC  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Years  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Age  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Sex  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Risk  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Plan type  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y  Y 
Plan FE  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y    Y  Y 
               
       
Observations  3,715,260  3,729,885  3,677,771  3,715,260-  2,483,522  599,247  14,053,576  2,330,377  2,218,738  3,514,405   7,838,725 
R-squared  0.529  0.160  0.523  0.543  0.145  0.499  0.240  0.545  0.527  0.536  0.015 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
†† These sensitivity analyses test the robustness of our main results against changes in the variables or sample. Column 1 is again the main coefficient of interest. 
The remaining columns show the following modifications: (2) risk scores in deciles rather than a continuous variable; (3) excluding cost sharing from spending; 
(4) including prescription drug spending; (5) prospective risk score lagged by 1 year; (6) restricting to continuous enrollees over 7 years during the study period; 
(7) quarterly model at the enrollee level. Columns (8-11) test alternative control groups that were possible to construct using the available data. These alternative 
control groups have drawbacks that we describe here and note in the paper. (8) HMO only controls from the 8 Northeastern states. This group fails to capture all 
enrollees in plans comparable to the AQC, which require designating a PCP and have incentives for receiving care in network. Also, this group had significant 
differences in pre-intervention spending trends compared to the AQC. (9) All Massachusetts control group. This group is not ideal because it contains BCBSMA 
(treatment) enrollees as well; we could not separate BCBSMA enrollees from Harvard Pilgrim, Tufts, or other private payers in MA due to the absence of payer 
IDs in the Truven data for confidentiality. Moreover, this control group also had significant differences in pre-intervention spending trends relative to the AQC. 
(10) Non-AQC BCBSMA control group (enrollees whose providers had not joined the AQC by 2012). This is not an ideal control group because the remaining 
providers in non-incentive contracts were small, rural practices that received lower fee updates from BCBSMA as a consequence of remaining in fee-for-service. 
Moreover, this control group also had significant differences in pre-intervention spending trends relative to the AQC. The Massachusetts only control groups are 
also susceptible to spillover effects. (11) National controls comprising a 10% random sample of enrollees in the 49 non-Massachusetts states in the Truven data. 
As with the main control group, national controls are susceptible to other factors in Massachusetts affecting the results, which we discuss in the paper. However, 
the national control group does not contaminate controls with treatment subjects and is less susceptible to AQC spillover effects within Massachusetts. Of note, 
similar to the baseline control group, this national control group demonstrated no significant differences in pre-intervention spending trends relative to the AQC. 71 
 
Table 9. Changes in Utilization in Treatment and Control Groups (volume per 1000 enrollees per quarter) 
 
     
2009 AQC Cohort 
 
Control 
 
Average Change in Volume  
Associated with the AQC 
  
                 
  
Category of Service  Pre  Post 
 
Pre  Post 
   
   
(2006-08)  (2009-10) 
 
(2006-08)  (2009-10) 
 
Unadjusted  Adjusted  P value 
                   
Cardiovascular 
               
  
   Coronary artery bypass graft  0.14  0.15 
 
0.17  0.15 
 
0.03  0.01  0.60 
   Aneurysm repair  0.01  0.02 
 
0.02  0.03 
 
0.00  0.00  0.80 
   Endarterectomy  0.04  0.03 
 
0.03  0.04 
 
-0.02  -0.01  0.07 
   Angioplasty  0.58  0.49 
 
0.62  0.60 
 
-0.07  -0.12  0.02 
   Pacemaker  0.14  0.15 
 
0.18  0.19 
 
0.00  -0.02  0.41 
   Other  3.71  2.85 
 
4.26  3.00 
 
0.40  0.15  0.46 
                   
Imaging 
               
  
   Standard imaging  251.99  269.85 
 
265.21  271.10 
 
11.97  6.19  0.05 
   CT  38.23  39.21 
 
41.30  39.59 
 
2.69  1.16  0.07 
   MRI  49.18  48.50 
 
48.00  46.95 
 
0.37  -1.06  0.30 
   Ultrasound/Echo  99.56  95.80 
 
96.22  89.00 
 
3.46  0.47  0.72 
   Imaging procedures  13.26  15.67 
 
14.28  16.03 
 
0.66  0.07  0.87 
                   
Orthopedics 
               
  
   Hip replacement  0.15  0.22 
 
0.18  0.22 
 
0.03  0.02  0.29 
   Knee replacement  0.23  0.31 
 
0.29  0.35 
 
0.02  0.01  0.63 
 
This table was previously published in Song Z, Fendrick AM, Safran DG, Landon B, Chernew ME. Global Budgets and Technology-
Intensive Medical Services. Healthcare (Amst). 2013 Jun;1(1-2):15-21.
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Table 10. Change in Performance on Measures of Quality of Ambulatory Care in the 2009 AQC Cohort and Control Groups.  
 
Quality metric  2009 AQC Cohort   Control  Change in Quality 
Associated with AQC 
Decomposition of Quality 
Results by Year 
 
Pre 
(2007- 
2008) 
Post 
(2009- 
2010)  Change 
Pre 
(2007- 
2008) 
Post 
(2009- 
2010)  Change  Unadj.  Adjusted 
Year-1 
(2009) effect 
Year-2 
(2010) effect 
                           
  % of eligible enrollees for whom performance threshold 
was met      P    P    P 
Chronic care management 
(aggregate)  79.1  83.3  4.2  79.7  80.0  0.3  3.9  3.7  <0.001  2.6  <0.001  4.7  <0.001 
Cardiovascular LDL 
cholesterol screening  88.6  91.1  2.5  90.2  89.8  -0.4  2.9  3.0  <0.001  1.8  0.04  4.5  <0.001 
Diabetes                           
Glycated hemoglobin 
testing  89.3  92.4  3.1  89.3  90.3  1.0  2.1  2.1  <0.001  1.7  <0.001  2.5  <0.001 
Eye exam  58.5  65.2  6.7  61.7  61.2  -0.5  7.2  7.2  <0.001  5.5  <0.001  8.8  <0.001 
LDL cholesterol screening  86.6  90.6  4.0  86.2  86.9  0.7  3.3  3.3  <0.001  2.8  <0.001  3.8  <0.001 
Nephrology screening  85.1  88.3  3.2  83.6  83.7  0.1  3.1  2.9  <0.001  1.6  0.001  4.2  <0.001 
Depression                           
Short-term prescription  67.2  68.0  0.8  66.9  66.9  0.0  0.8  0.5  0.78  -1.1  0.59  1.6  0.44 
Maintenance prescription  51.2  53.8  2.6  51.1  50.5  -0.6  3.2  2.9  0.09  1.1  0.59  3.9  0.07 
                           
Adult preventive care 
(aggregate)  75.7  80.0  4.3  72.8  76.5  3.7  0.6  0.4  0.004  0.1  0.67  0.7  <0.001 
Breast cancer screening  80.2  83.7  3.5  79.6  81.1  1.5  2.0  1.2  <0.001  0.6  0.006  1.9  <0.001 
Cervical cancer screening  87.3  87.7  0.4  84.3  85.1  0.8  -0.4  -0.4  0.01  -0.5  0.002  -0.3  0.14 
Colorectal cancer screening  64.2  71.7  7.5  59.7  67.1  7.4  0.1  0.0  0.92  0.0  0.97  0.3  0.26 
Chlamydia screening for 
enrollees 21–24 yr of age  58.6  65.8  7.2  53.9  61.2  7.3  -0.1  0.0  0.99  -0.8  0.41  0.7  0.51 
No antibiotics for acute 
bronchitis  18.7  28.1  9.4  19.9  21.1  1.2  8.2  9.4  <0.001  5.5  <0.001  13.1  <0.001  
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Pediatric care (aggregate)  79.5  82.8  3.3  74.7  77.1  2.4  0.9  1.3  <0.001  0.7  0.001  1.9  <0.001 
Appropriate testing for 
pharyngitis  93.9  96.1  2.2  81.8  90.5  8.7  -6.5  -6.1  <0.001  -3.9  <0.001  -7.5  <0.001 
Chlamydia screening for 
enrollees 16–20 yr of age  54.8  66.0  11.2  51.3  55.9  4.6  6.6  6.8  <0.001  5.4  <0.001  8.2  <0.001 
No antibiotics for upper 
respiratory infection  94.9  95.5  0.6  92.1  93.7  1.6  -1.0  -1.0  0.04  -0.4  0.52  -1.8  0.006 
Well care                           
Babies <15 mo of age  93.0  94.0  1.0  92.5  93.4  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.77  -0.1  0.91  0.6  <0.001 
Children 3-6 yr of age  92.3  94.8  2.5  90.0  91.3  1.3  1.2  1.1  <0.001  0.6  0.09  1.6  <0.001 
Adolescents  73.8  77.9  4.1  69.1  71.9  2.8  1.3  1.7  <0.001  0.09  <0.001  2.5  <0.001 
 
* Adjusted results are from a difference-in-differences multivariate model at the enrollee-year level. The intervention group was the 
2009 AQC cohort. The control group comprised Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts enrollees whose primary care physicians 
belonged to organizations that did not enter the AQC. Pooled observations were used for the aggregate analyses of chronic care 
management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care. Analyses were further adjusted for measure-level fixed effects. 
 
This table was previously published in Song Z, Safran DG, Landon BE, Landrum MB, He Y, Mechanic RE, Day MP, Chernew ME. 
The 'Alternative Quality Contract,' based on a global budget, lowered medical spending and improved quality. Health Aff (Millwood). 
2012 Aug;31(8):1885-94.
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Table 11. Ambulatory Process Quality: AQC Cohorts vs. HEDIS National Average* 
 
 
AQC 
Cohorts 
 
HEDIS  
National Average 
 
Unadjusted 
 
Pre  Post  Change  Pre  Post  Change 
Difference-in-
differences 
                2009 AQC Cohort   2006-08  2009-12 
 
2006-08  2009-12 
 
Over 4 Years 
Chronic Care Management  79.6  84.5  5.0  79.8  80.8  1.1  3.9 
Adult Preventive Care  75.9  80.7  4.8  57.5  59.6  2.1  2.7 
Pediatric Care  79.5  84.0  4.5  68.8  70.9  2.1  2.4 
                2010 AQC Cohort   2006-09  2010-12 
 
2006-09  2010-12 
 
Over 3 Years 
Chronic Care Management  80.30  82.59  2.3  79.97  80.97  1.0  1.29 
Adult Preventive Care  74.77  79.93  5.2  58.03  59.73  1.7  3.45 
Pediatric Care  75.94  80.75  4.8  69.10  71.33  2.2  2.58 
                2011 AQC Cohort   2006-10  2011-12 
 
2006-10  2011-12 
 
Over 2 Years 
Chronic Care Management  79.39  81.37  2.0  80.25  80.90  0.7  1.33 
Adult Preventive Care  72.77  79.11  6.3  58.38  59.90  1.5  4.81 
Pediatric Care  75.26  79.89  4.6  69.50  71.65  2.2  2.48 
                2012 AQC Cohort   2006-11  2012 
 
2006-11  2012 
 
Over 1 Year 
Chronic Care Management  82.08  80.54  -1.5  80.36  81.00  0.6  -2.18 
Adult Preventive Care  77.26  78.04  0.8  58.68  59.90  1.2  -0.44 
Pediatric Care  80.14  81.86  1.7  69.92  71.70  1.8  -0.06 
* Values designate the percent of eligible enrollees for a measure whose care achieved threshold performance for the measure. These 3 aggregate 
ambulatory process measures are weighted averages of individual measures in each category. Chronic Care Management measures are: 
cardiovascular LDL screening; hemoglobin A1c testing, eye exam, LDL screening, and nephrology screening for patients with diabetes; and short-
term and maintenance prescription for patients with depression. Adult Preventive Care measures are: breast cancer, cervical cancer, and colorectal 
cancer screening; chlamydia screening for enrollees aged 21-24 years; and no antibiotics for acute bronchitis. Pediatric measures are: appropriate 
testing for pharyngitis; chlamydia screening for enrollees aged 16-20 years; no antibiotics for upper respiratory infections; and well care for babies 
(<15 months), children (3-6 years), and adolescents (12-21 years). All analyses are unadjusted. In other words, they are calculations based on raw 
weighted averages in the groups before and after their respective intervention dates.   
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Table 12. Outcome Quality: 2009 AQC Cohort vs. HEDIS National Average* 
 
 
 
2009 AQC Cohort  HEDIS National Average 
 
2009  2010  2011  2012  2011  2012 
Outcome Measures  Percent of population achieving 
performance (%) 
Percent of population 
achieving performance (%) 
Diabetic HbA1c Control 
(≤9 percent)  80.6  82.4  83.9  84.1  71.7  71.5 
Diabetic LDL Cholesterol 
Control (<100mg)  57.7  61.0  64.1  65.2  48.1  48.4 
Diabetic Blood Pressure 
Control (<140/80)  51.6  54.8  60.6  65.4  44.2  44.3 
LDL Cholesterol Control in 
Cardiovascular Patients 
(<100mg) 
69.9  72.3  74.0  74.8  59.8  59.9 
Blood Pressure Control in 
Cardiovascular Patients 
(<140/90) 
68.4  71.1  78.3  80.4  65.4  63.0 
Average  65.6  68.3  72.2  74.0  57.8  57.4 
 
* Values designate the percent of eligible enrollees for a measure whose care achieved a defined 
threshold of quality performance for the measure. “HEDIS” is the Healthcare Effectiveness Data 
and Information Set. “HbA1c” ﾠis ﾠhemoglobin ﾠA1c. ﾠ“LDL” ﾠis ﾠlow-density lipoprotein cholesterol.  
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